It's not news that SCADA vendors still have gaping holes in their PLC and HMI development environments.
Research into 7 different PLC vendor software systems details an almost negligent lack of security standards in modern SCADA environments. This lack of security creates great opportunity for future attackers and the next high-profile attack on industrial control systems.
The attack scenario cannot be understated as critical systems such as power, water, transportation, and manufacturing. all rely on major PLC vendors in one way or another. This session will show a theoretical attack that could have happened using recently discovered vulnerabilities and proof of concept code to disrupt a major power industrial system.
Joseph Bingham will share observations on vulnerabilities found in vendors across the board and mitigation techniques for using these required software in highly critical environments where even air-gapping is not enough to remove the threat of a remote attacker.
Learning Objectives- SCADA systems are extremely critical and their security needs to be considered much more highly in the future.
- Some vendors are more reliable than others for a secure environment.
- Demonstration of actual SCADA attack, practical attack vectors
- Mitigation techniques for existing SCADA environments.
